

Toward a Euro-Atlantic Confederation

**(A Proposal for Kant, Hugo and Tolstoy to shake hands in Kaliningrad, Paris,
and Sebastopol)**

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ONE VISION, THREE PATHS

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A major crisis is brewing in Europe much as the two founders of American containment strategy, George Kennan and Paul Nitze, among others, had forewarned in 1997— in opposing the decision to enlarge NATO.¹ Despite the warnings from these experienced “Cold Warriors,” the Clinton administration, and then the Bush Jr administration, opted to expand NATO membership.² In effect, the US and NATO remained deaf to American global strategists who had a lifetime of experience in dealing with the Soviet Union— while concurrently ignoring Russian warnings against NATO enlargement.

The decision to enlarge NATO helped to set off a number of issues which have begun to provoke a spiralling “insecurity-security dialectic” between the US, NATO, European Union and Russia in the post-Cold War era.³ An “insecurity-security dialectic” takes place when the fears and perceptions of insecurity lead states to augment a number of defence and security measures in the hopes of obtaining greater security. These countermeasures tend to foster new and wider threat perceptions that, in turn, lead other states to take differing countermeasures as well. The danger then is that such countermeasures do not provide greater security but in fact lead to new perceptions of insecurity, not just for two states, but potentially, for an even wider number of states.

The security concerns posed by NATO enlargement to the Russian borders (particularly to the Baltic states in close proximity to St. Petersburg and Moscow) has, for example, led Moscow to engage in over flights of Baltic territory and to test air defenses. The essentially unilateral US decision (without NATO or EU input) to deploy National Missile Defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic (ostensibly as a means to counter a potential Iranian nuclear threat) has led Moscow to make a counter threat of deploying nuclear weaponry and radar jamming systems in Kaliningrad.⁴ The so-called “Russian-Estonian” cyber conflict in April-May 2007, which was probably caused by civilian, and not Russian government, hackers, nevertheless resulted in the creation of NATO cyber defense center in Tallin in 2008-09.⁵

Ukrainian-Russian disputes over energy transit and debts have led to provocative calls for NATO to engage in militarized Article V responses in case of future energy cut offs.⁶ US/NATO support for Ukrainian and Georgian membership in NATO, coupled with Kiev’s demands that Russia withdraw its fleet from Sebastopol before 2017, has resulted in Russian pan-nationalist threats to support secessionist movements in the Crimea and eastern Ukraine.⁷ The August 2008 Georgia-Russia conflict sent shivers down the spines of all states along the Russian border. Washington’s recognition of “national independence” for Kosovo led Moscow to recognize the largely failed states of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in an ostensible “tit for tat” response, possibly opening a can of worms in which other secessionist movements will likewise demand “national independence.”

Fears of a renewed Russo-Georgian war, after August 2008, have raised new fears and defense reactions, essentially provoking an arms race in the Caucasus.⁸ By mid-June 2009, Russia vetoed the UN mission working in Abkhazia and likewise blocked the renewed mandate for the OSCE mission in South Ossetia in response to the western refusal to recognize that essentially “failed” region.⁹ This fact lowered hopes for role of international mediators and peacekeepers in helping to achieve a diplomatic settlement. *Nevertheless, as shall be argued, it may be possible to reframe the dispute so as to find a possible compromise.*

NATO-Russia Council cooperation had been suspended at the time of the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war, but it has been revived after the 27-28 June 2009 meetings of OSCE and NATO foreign ministers in Corfu, largely in response to Russian President Dmitri Medvedev’s offer to negotiate a new “pan-European security pact” and all outstanding issues with the US as an equal partner on the basis of mutual respect and *parity*.¹⁰ In his first state-of-the-nation address on November 6, 2008, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev’s had greeted US President-elect Barack Obama with warnings that Moscow would deploy nuclear-capable Iskander ("Alexander the Great") missiles and radar jamming systems in Kaliningrad. These threats (which were also made in the Yeltsin period but largely ignored by Washington) were intended to counter US National Missile Defense (NMD) systems to be deployed in Poland and the Czech Republic— if the US did not give Russian interests priority in US foreign policy. The Russian approach, however, has been

sweet and sour: Promises of compromise, accompanied by threats, have not always obtained much *empathy*.¹¹

These spiraling ‘dialectics of insecurity and security’ represent just a few of the points of contention that have been provoking actions and counter-actions, escalating tensions between the US, NATO, European Union and Russia. One cannot forget that the nature of military contingency planning generally consists of worst-case scenarios: The “insecurity-security dialectic” often involves demands for *anticipatory actions* resulting in overreaction and for engaging in excessive military build-ups so as to be ‘safe rather than sorry’.

The post-Cold War era has furthermore involved an essentially uncoordinated “triple enlargement” into former Soviet-controlled space. Here, not only have both NATO and the European Union enlarged into areas once considered ‘spheres of influence and security’ by the Soviet Union (or what Moscow now calls the ‘near abroad’), but the essentially unilateral American deployment of National Missile Defense systems, proposed for Poland and the Czech Republic, have represented a third form of “enlargement” of US defense capabilities into former Soviet space. This largely uncoordinated “triple enlargement” has tended to further exacerbate Russian perceptions and fears of insecurity. (This appears true given the fact that Russia has had only very minimal input as member of the NATO-Russia Council despite US-Russian cooperation with respect to tactical BMD systems, for example.¹²)

Despite room for potential cooperation, a dangerous rivalry between the US/NATO, the EU and Russia/CSTO for geostrategic positioning and political economic influence has consequently been brewing in the Caucasus, Black Sea/Ukraine and central Asia. After the Georgia-Russia conflict in August 2008, it is not hard to imagine how such a clash could be sparked if Moscow sought to safeguard its “near abroad” and acted to check the formation of “Baltic-Black Sea” alliance backed by NATO and the European Union (regarded as a means to isolate Moscow politically and economically)—while an expanding NATO and European Union (linked to the EU’s new May 2009 “Eastern Partnership” with former Soviet bloc states¹³) concurrently sought to protect states of eastern Europe and the Caucasus against Russian pressures and secure energy transit routes.

The possibility of direct major power conflict may represent a worst case scenario, but there is nevertheless a real danger of a new partition in which the US/NATO, and European Union begin to dig trenches against Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)—while at the same time both sides continue to dispute the spaces left over after Soviet disaggregation that have not been clearly “defined” by major power ‘spheres of influence and security.’

The only way out of this “insecurity-security dialectic” that could lead to continual conflict, attempts at partition, if not major power war, is to fully engage in

diplomacy and find cooperative/ collective measures that can not only prevent misperceptions from spiraling out of control, *but that can also help to find compromise among the rival and competing interests of differing states in a collective framework.* The implementation of a new system of Euro-Atlantic security, ultimately leading to a Euro-Atlantic Confederation, could help prevent a new partition of Europe between NATO/EU and Russia/CSTO. Unlike the Cold War partition between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, such a new partition of Europe could not be held stable for a very long time— and would eventually provoke new disputes and conflicts.

From this perspective, we must find the areas where the US, NATO, European Union and Russia can all work together, but also point out as honestly as possible where disagreements remain. Here, on the one hand, NATO enlargement represents a *fait accompli* and cannot be reversed, although it can be modified and reformed. (Here, in rejoining NATO's integrated military command, France has taken the leadership of the Allied Command Transformation, and is, in effect, responsible for future reforms of the Atlantic Alliance.) On the other hand, there is still room for compromise over the Black Sea and Caucasus regions which represent regions that remain “open” and that have not yet been clearly defined as ‘spheres of influence and security.’ In the long term, there should be room for additional compromise— in terms of “indivisible security” as opposed to “overlapping guarantees of security”¹⁴— but that remains in the more distant future.

My viewpoint thus most closely corresponds to scenario of “partial reconstruction” as outlined in the *EastWest Institute's* report, EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY: ONE VISION, THREE PATHS.

My key point is that

1. In those areas in which the spaces are most clearly defined due to NATO membership, or due to membership in the Russian-led CSTO, we must find ways to soften the edges and reduce tensions.
2. In those areas that are still under dispute for power and influence (the Black Sea, Caucasus and, to a lesser extent, central Asia), we must find ways to engage in cooperative-collective security, which means real *power sharing* that would result in the establishment of “regional security communities”— involving greater transparency and *overlapping* guarantees of security.

I thus believe that we must seek ways to soften the edges of NATO enlargement so that we satisfy the *legitimate* security concerns of the eastern European states who have now acquired NATO's article 5 security guarantees, but we also need to satisfy the *legitimate* security concerns of the Russian Federation who has opposed NATO's military capabilities approaching Russian borders— in which F-15s and F-16s fly within minutes of Saint Petersburg and Moscow...

Preventing a new partition of Europe, if not continual conflict over ‘spheres of influence and security,’ accordingly requires the development of a “cooperative-collective” approach to security involving the interests and concerns of a larger collectivity of states. My proposal, in brief, is to engage in a such a cooperative-collective approach to the security of eastern Europe, the Black Sea and Caucasus through the establishment of Centers of Defense and Security Coordination in which US, NATO, the EU, Ukraine and Russia/CSTO would all collaborate.¹⁵

These Centers of Defense and Security Coordination could be placed in Kaliningrad and Sebastopol under OSCE auspices, and in cooperation with a proposed Euro-Atlantic Strategic Council, which would be made up of representatives from the US, NATO, European Union, and Russia. Moreover, as France has now taken command of the Allied Command Transformation (ACT), as previously mentioned, Paris should play a major role in helping to reform and reshape the Atlantic Alliance—in the process of strengthening *both* European Union *and* Russian participation in the defense and security of the Euro-Atlantic.

In such a way, Immanuel Kant (who lived in Prussian Königsburg, now Russian Kaliningrad), Victor Hugo (from Paris) and Leo Tolstoy, who participated in the wars in the Caucasus and Sebastopol/ Crimea (which is now Ukrainian) before developing his philosophy of non-violence, can all shake hands together in a Euro-Atlantic Security Community (EASC)— ultimately leading to a Euro-Atlantic Confederation, or a new form of “United States of Europe,” as first proposed by Victor Hugo. (See Postscript.)

Toward an EASC working with the OSCE

A new Euro-Atlantic Security Community could be achieved through the formation of a “Euro-Atlantic Strategic Council” made up of representatives from the US, NATO, European Union and Russia that would work in close interaction with the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Such a Euro-Atlantic Strategic Council would seek to better coordinate US-EU interaction *in all of its political and economic dimensions*— while concurrently finding ways to bring Russia into closer cooperation with Euro-Atlantic security concerns. Here, the US and Europeans need to first put their own houses in order, before they can effectively deal with Russia. In essence, the US and EU need to transcend their focus on trade disputes and begin to think more strategically with regard to Russia, the Black Sea, the Caucasus and the Mediterranean, etc.) The ultimate objective is to move practically, but as rapidly as possible, *beyond* the present state of uneasy détente with Russia, and toward entente— if not alliance.

The first task of a Euro-Atlantic Strategic Council (working closely with the OSCE) would be to establish common US, European and Russian activities by

identifying common threats (terrorism, drug trade, ballistic missile threats, arms trafficking etc.) through joint policy group analyses.

A second step would be to engage in confidence building and peacekeeping measures throughout Eastern Europe along the territories where NATO and Russia/CSTO now meet.¹⁶

In order to prevent misperceptions and accidents that could lead to potential conflict (a Russian Su-27 fighter jet crashed on Lithuanian territory in 2005, for example), it appears necessary to better coordinate military activities and oversight.¹⁷ Better coordination of military flights could be accompanied by engaging in joint border patrols, joint flights over adjacent air space, and inspections of weapon systems among other joint security measures. While the Cooperative Airspace Initiative is significant,¹⁸ more active and engaged *joint* participation appears necessary. A Center for Defense and Security Coordination could be implemented in Kaliningrad to better coordinate joint defense and security cooperation. (See continuing discussion.)

These political-security arrangements need to be accompanied by radical reductions in conventional weaponry through implementation of the *adapted* CFE treaty of 1999. Here, we need to find ways to boost confidence and engage in *joint* security, involving OSCE inspections of troop numbers and weapons, as already agreed by the adapted CFE treaty— *which is in urgent need of revitalization*.

To establish systems of cooperative-collective security, that will more fully include Russia, NATO members need to indirectly *de-link* the conditionality that they have previously set in order to sign the adapted CFE treaty. NATO members have thus far agreed to sign the adapted CFE treaty only once Russian forces withdraw from Moldova and Georgia— as Moscow had initially agreed in signing the adapted CFE accord in Istanbul in 1999.

Here, however, rather than urging Russia to withdraw forces unilaterally (without a *quid pro quo*), NATO states could sign the adapted CFE treaty once Russia would agree to the *phased* withdrawal of Russian forces from both Transdnistra and Georgia. This delinkage can take place once Russian forces are replaced by joint OSCE-Russian or other international peacekeepers under an OSCE mandate.¹⁹ Here, the OSCE needs to press Moldova and the Transdnistra, as well as Georgia and Abkhasia/ South Ossetia for an agreement that respects the “independence” of both sides, but which nevertheless looks toward the establishment political-economic linkages that enhance cooperation through larger ‘confederal’ arrangements.²⁰

These accords should accordingly take place in the context of creating a larger “regional security community” for the Caucasus in particular, but also for Transdnistra-Moldovan that would involve “overlapping security guarantees” that would, in effect, bring Transdnistra and Abkhasia/ South Ossetia into political

economic cooperation with both Moldova and Georgia respectively in new forms of confederation.²¹ This position thus argues against *fully* re-absorbing these newly ‘independent’ regions under the Moldovian or Georgian central governments. There would accordingly be recognition of the ‘independence’ of these regions, but a recognition situated *within* a larger confederation.

From this perspective, it does not appear to be in Moscow’s long term interest to subsidize these essentially “failed” provinces, or sustain Russian troops, indefinitely. But neither do these newly ‘independent’ states necessarily want to remain under a Russian protectorate— if they could possibly join a larger confederation that would likewise protect their relative independence or autonomy. The political and economic benefits of joining a larger confederation should, at least ideally, outweigh claims to ‘independence’.

This leads me to my next point: In those areas of disputed space, particularly in the Caucasus and the Black Sea regions, I would thus propose the establishment of “regional security communities” involving *separate* structures of defence and security coordination under a general OSCE mandate. The dilemma raised here is that NATO membership for Georgia *alone* would not resolve the complex security concerns of the entire Caucasus region and would only add to the dilemmas of the “insecurity-security dialectic”— possibly leading Russia and the CSTO to take countermeasures. Likewise Ukrainian membership in NATO would not resolve complex Ukrainian-Russian political economic, energy and security disputes in the aftermath of Soviet collapse.²²

Such regional security communities would not only seek to guarantee security for all their members, but they would also seek to maintain trade and investment opportunities and help create wider markets. Moreover, due to the fact the Caucasus and Black Sea possess significant economic potential as energy transit routes, a larger Black Sea Community linked to a Caucasus confederation would work to generate greater wealth throughout the entire region. From this perspective, there is tremendous incentive to work in cooperation in a larger confederation, as opposed to trying to sustain the so-called “national independence” of a number of weak or failed states (or provinces) in an era of increasing globalization.

To achieve such a ‘regional security community’ in the Caucasus, the US, EU, and Russia should strongly support Turkish proposals for a "Caucasus Stability and Co-operation Platform” as already backed by French President Sarkozy.²³ Thus instead of expanding NATO to the Caucasus, a regional security community would seek, in the near term, to establish a political confederation of Caucasian states involving protection of minority groups— so as to help resolve complex and deep rooted inter-communal conflicts. Such a security community could involve joint US-Russian-CSTO-European peacekeeping efforts— perhaps by deploying forces trained by NATO’s Partnership for Peace initiative that could be accepted by all sides. These peacekeepers under OSCE auspices would seek to prevent ethnic conflict, but also *jointly* guard energy transit routes...

South Ossetia and Abkhazia could thus remain relatively “independent” (as Moscow has demanded), but linked through closer political economic accords to *both* Russia *and* Georgia through a “regional security community.” Furthermore, the hope raised by OSCE Minsk Group to guarantee a long-term cease-fire in Nagorno-Karabakh, coupled with agreements between Armenia and Azerbaijan, plus an Armenian rapprochement with Turkey, could represent the first steps toward the formation of such a regional security community— or even a confederation.²⁴ Here I would propose an international troop presence in Nagorno-Karabakh under OSCE auspices (if a political settlement can be mediated) and in other sensitive regions of potential dispute throughout eastern Europe and the Caucasus (in areas that involve irredentist claims, for example). Concurrently, Serbia and Kosovo should continue to be nudged into closer political-economic cooperation by the UN and OSCE where possible, despite Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence (an ‘independence’ which has not been recognized by all countries). Obviously, however, it takes time to calm passions after years of bitter repression, and ethnic warfare in these regions.

Such a collective-cooperative security approach would likewise require strengthening the Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization,²⁵ which could set up a Black Sea Security and Defense Coordination Center (or a *separate* peacekeeping command)— jointly overseen by the US, NATO, EU, Ukraine and Russia, once again under OSCE auspices.

Instead of trying to impose NATO’s integrated command structure *from above* upon these regions (opposed by *both* Russia *and* Turkey), a separate Coordination Center for Black Sea Defense and Security could be created *from below*.²⁶ Here, however, Kiev has been skeptical of promises of ‘collective security’ after the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (including Russia) had promised to guarantee Ukrainian security— once the latter gave up its nuclear weapons capability left over from the Soviet era in 1994. Ukrainian skepticism of ‘collective security’ is to a large extent based upon the fact that these promises of “security guarantees” did not materialize when Russia unilaterally acted against Ukrainian interests in the Sea of Azov in October 2003, for example, and due to the fact that Kiev has sought the withdrawal of the Russian fleet from Sebastopol by 2017.²⁷

In effect, Moscow and Kiev have engaged in a not-so-civilized divorce settlement since the break up of the Soviet Union. The problem, however, is that it is also not clear how NATO membership will necessarily protect Ukraine either, as Russia is likely to boost support for secessionist movements inside eastern Ukraine and the Crimea— if Ukraine does eventually try to enter NATO or press the Russian Black Sea fleet from the Crimea. One possibility is to let Russia and Ukraine enter together, thus Ukrainian membership would no longer pose a problem. Here, however, largely due to Russia’s Eurasian position, it appears dubious that NATO would want to defend Russia’s Asian flank, while Russia would not always support NATO’s positions in eastern Europe or elsewhere (and eastern European states would remain suspicious of Russian intentions). If full membership for Russia in

NATO is not possible, then NATO and Russia need to find means of joint collaboration involving *overlapping* security guarantees for those states that are not expected to become full members of either NATO or the CSTO. (Once again, it seems that the concept of “indivisible security” could only be possible if both sides could equally and mutually protect each other’s general interests and security concerns.²⁸)

If both Ukraine and Russia cannot enter as “full” members of NATO concurrently,²⁹ another possible option to Ukrainian membership in NATO is to engage Russia in a cooperative-collective security approach through NATO-Russia-European-Ukrainian cooperation. The problem is to develop a system of cooperative-collective security involving overlapping security accords that are designed to protect gas and oil pipelines, shipping and transport. Such a system could involve *joint* patrols against weapons and drug smuggling, human trafficking, etc. It could even forge *joint* US-European Russian special force teams that could cooperate against partisan “terrorist” organizations, obviously where there is political agreement to do so...

In terms of energy security, Russian-Ukrainian disputes in the winter of 2008-2009 over energy payments and debts led to a cut off of gas supplies for European consumers— raising provocative calls for NATO to consider Article V military preparations in case of future energy cut offs (as if military action could actually do something to stop the break down of energy supplies). Here, however, it appears necessary to provide political economic incentives and international oversight in order to prevent the recurrence of such energy disputes. It appears absurd to further militarize an already complex situation, which, in effect, provokes an “insecurity-security dialectic.”

A *conjoint* NATO-EU-Ukrainian-Russian Defense and Security Coordination Center could be centered in Sebastopol under general OSCE auspices. In effect, Russia would not be forced to move its fleet from the Crimea, but could enter into defense and security cooperation with all the states of the region. This proposal would need to be negotiated *before* 2017— the date when Kiev has insisted that the Russian fleet withdraw from Sebastopol. Here, not only are Russian options to move its fleet are very limited, but simply withdrawing the fleet from Sebastopol does not address the *collective* need for defense and security cooperation throughout the region.³⁰ At the same time, the status quo appears unsatisfactory as well.

A Black Sea security community could accordingly interlink with a Caucasus security community—as an extension of the EU Eastern Partnership— and in synergy with the proposed Union for the Mediterranean. NATO member Turkey could play the role as the key intermediary in these regions.³¹ Developing a system of *cooperative-collective security* through regional security communities and a *separate command or security coordination structure* represents a ‘win-win’ situation— as opposed to trying to define spheres of influence and security between US/ NATO and Russia/ CSTO within the Black Sea region— a region which is

strategically and economically vital to Russia, Central Asia, the Mediterranean, Turkey, and Europe and the USA as a whole.

Tensions between Russia and Ukraine over the Crimea and the Russian fleet at Sebastopol represent a dangerous flashpoint of potential conflict in the not-so-long term— unless a face saving option agreeable to both Moscow and Kiev can be found through the creation of a wider system of regional security that incorporates the real interests of both parties. Here, given the ‘win–win’ possibilities of *internationalizing* Black Sea defense and security, it is up to the OSCE to help mediate— as the dispute over Sebastopol should not remain bilateral...

Moreover, in general terms, the concept of confederation, as opposed to that of ‘national independence,’ needs to be given greater international ideological support. On a side note, the Obama administration should thus either rescind or substantially modify the “Captive Nations resolution” which, in effect, supports national and ethnic “independence” movements throughout the world. In effect, the Captive Nations concept has become a ‘doubled edged sword’ following US support for the declaration of Kosovar independence and Russian support for the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.³²

And finally, the formation of new Euro-Atlantic Strategic Council could help better *coordinate* relations between the US, NATO, EU and Russia.³³ While working with the OSCE and UN where possible, a Euro-Atlantic Strategic Council would seek to permit Russia greater power sharing and involve Moscow in real decision making actions— *at least in specifically defined and agreed areas of mutual interests, but without splitting NATO or the European Union*. A Euro-Atlantic Strategic Council would thus go beyond the model of the present NATO-Russia Council— which only gives Russia a voice, but not a veto— and which is really not capable of dealing with “softer” political and diplomatic issues that transcend more traditional “hard” security.

The fact that it was France, acting in the presidency of the European Union, who was able to mediate the Georgia- Russia conflict in August 2008 (even if imperfectly)— and not the NATO-Russia Council— means that the French/ European Union position needs to be heard in Washington. Here, the EU role should be given a stronger voice in Washington, within a Euro-Atlantic Strategic Council, along with NATO and Russia, but in seeking out a better balance between the positions of east and west Europeans.

On one hand, such a Euro-Atlantic Strategic Council is first needed to help the US and Europeans communicate more effectively with each other on all issues (from Roquefort cheese to National Missile Defenses)— and not just with respect to Russia. The creation of a Euro-Atlantic Strategic Council would seek to better coordinate relations among already existing institutions behind the scenes. Such a Euro-Atlantic Strategic Council can consequently help better *coordinate* the differing and often conflicting activities of NATO, EU, the OSCE, but also in working with

Russia, the CSTO and, where necessary, China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

On the other hand, in realistic terms, neither the US, nor the EU, is ready to deal with Russia on a *fully* equal basis yet. After both the Kosovo and Georgia-Russia conflicts in particular, there needs to be a step-by-step or staged approach on practical matters where both sides can ultimately agree to cooperate. All sides need to identify the areas where they will agree to negotiate with regard to US-European-Russian cooperation on CFE, START, BMD, tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and with regard to Afghanistan/ Pakistan, the Caucasus, Black Sea, Iran, etc.³⁴

Here, for example, following a detailed examination of deployment options for its different components in various locations (Poland, the Czech Republic, Azerbaijan, Russia itself), for example, a joint US-EU-Russian Ballistic Missile Defense command could eventually be set up. The proposed NMD system to be deployed in Poland and Czech Republic could be put on hold for the time being until its costs and effectiveness can be accurately assessed and once Moscow is *fully* reassured that the system is not aimed at Russia.³⁵ This approach can set the stage for an agreement on START and reductions of nuclear weaponry.

In addition to radical nuclear reductions promised by the START accords (now linked by Russia to cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defenses), there should be discussion of radical reductions of tactical nuclear weapons. These discussions could perhaps lead to a treaty or formal agreement in which the US/NATO agree not to deploy nuclear weapons on the territories of new NATO members in exchange for radical nuclear weapons reductions on the Russian side. In the near future, a US/NATO, EU and Russian Headquarters for Security and Defense Coordination could be established in Kaliningrad in order to administer Ballistic Missile Defense cooperation, joint peacekeeping and anti-terrorism measures and other confidence and security building measures, plus cooperation against piracy, drug and human trafficking, etc.

What is needed, is an international conference, under OSCE auspices, that would begin define areas where the US, Europeans and Russians can work together. Once those areas are defined, it then would be the task of the Euro-Atlantic Strategic Council to begin to implement those agreements— in the effort to move US-EU-Russian relations from an uneasy *détente* at present toward an *entente*, if not alliance, relationship.

Postscript: Kant, Hugo, Tolstoy

Kant had written “Perpetual Peace” in Königsberg, where he lived without ever having traveled more than 100 miles from the city; that city is no longer Prussian, but Russian, now called Kaliningrad.

Tolstoy had, to a large extent, adopted his non-violent and anti-militarist stance following his military experiences in Caucasus in 1851, and then in Sebastopol during the Crimean war (1853-56), as depicted in *Tales from Sebastopol*, and during his trips throughout Europe in 1857 and 1860-61, where he met Victor Hugo.

In the 1849 Peace Conference, Hugo had called for “a United States of Europe,” in his speech, “My Revenge is Fraternity.” Victor Hugo’s great work *Les Miserables* had influenced Tolstoy’s *War and Peace*. In contemporary circumstances, a neo-Crimean conflict could be brewing over the Russian naval base in Sebastopol. The latter city is no longer Russian, but Ukrainian, but is still claimed by Russian pan-nationalists...

In geo-historical sense, these two cities Kaliningrad and Sebastopol (among dozens of others throughout Europe) have already been *internationalized*, but both have been *subject to irredentist claims at the level of civil society*. In fact, dozens of regions throughout Europe do not belong to one country, or even a predominant nationality, but in many cases, to several. The question of Sebastopol/Crimea is absolutely crucial in the relations between Russia and Ukraine; the question of Kaliningrad is also crucial in the relations between Germany/Europe and Russia. *The peace of Europe really depends upon preventing these two areas from becoming the focus of irredentist claims by state leaderships, in addition to social demands.*

Resolving the question of Kaliningrad is particularly crucial as a means to ameliorate relations between Russia and Europe. The issues are complex, involving military and border issues, environmental hazards, illegal migration, international crime (including the trafficking of drugs and people), the economic implications of EU enlargement, the development of energy export corridors and the prospects for increasing Western investment in Russian border regions, demands within Kaliningrad for secession or autonomy from Russia, among other problems and issues.

As an initial step toward resolving these issues, I thus propose that both Kaliningrad and Sebastopol become the Head Quarters of a new system of Euro-Atlantic security— as the stepping stones to “perpetual peace” (in Kant’s views) and to a confederal “United States of Europe” (in Hugo’s words)— or a new Euro-Atlantic confederation.

Kaliningrad could become the HQ of a new NATO-CSTO Center for Defense and Security Coordination, while Sebastopol would become the HQ of a Black Sea Coordination Center (or separate peacekeeping command) that would interlink with a Caucasian regional security community with the Black Sea, Russia and Europe in the *joint* protection of energy transit routes, as well as in the prevention of war and for the protection of minority rights.

Now that France is head of the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) which is responsible for the future reforms of NATO,³⁶ one possible reform is to work toward the implementation of a Euro-Atlantic Strategic Council that would seek to better coordinate the activities of the US, NATO, the European Union, Russia and the CSTO— in cooperation with the OSCE.

In such a way, the great spirits of Kant and Tolstoy would finally be able to shake hands in Kaliningrad, Sebastopol as well as in Paris, along with Victor Hugo.

Endnotes

¹ In February 1997, George Kennan asserted that NATO enlargement “would be the most fatal error of U.S. policy in the entire post-Cold era.”

In June 1997, Paul Nitze and other ‘Cold Warriors’ sent President Clinton the following letter:

“We, the undersigned, believe that the current U.S.-led effort to expand NATO, the focus of the recent Helsinki and Paris Summits, is a policy error of historic proportions. We believe that NATO expansion will decrease allied security and unsettle European stability for the following reasons:

In Russia, NATO expansion, which continues to be opposed across the entire political spectrum, will strengthen the non-democratic opposition, undercut those who favor reform and cooperation with the West, bring the Russians to question the entire post-Cold War settlement, and galvanize resistance in the Duma to the START II and III treaties;

In Europe, NATO expansion will draw a new line of division between the “ins” and the “outs,” foster instability, and ultimately diminish the sense of security of those countries which are not included;

In NATO, expansion, which the Alliance has indicated is open-ended, will inevitably degrade NATO’s ability to carry out its primary mission and will involve U.S. security guarantees to countries with serious border and national minority problems, and unevenly developed systems of democratic government;

In the U.S., NATO expansion will trigger an extended debate over its indeterminate, but certainly high, cost and will call into question the U.S. commitment to the Alliance, traditionally and rightly regarded as a centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy.”

http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/themes/past_themes/nato/pubs/open_letter.dot

² See Hall Gardner, *Averting Global War: Regional Challenges, Overextension, and Options for American Strategy* (Palgrave, 2007), Chapter 2; Hall Gardner, *Dangerous Crossroads: Europe, Russia and the Future of NATO* (Praeger, 1997); Hall Gardner, *Central and Southeastern Europe in Transition: Perspectives on Success and Failure Since 1989* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, March 1999), Chapter 10.

³ Hall Gardner, *Averting Global War: Regional Challenges, Overextension, and Options for American Strategy* (Palgrave, 2007), Chapter 1.

⁴ See critique of Iranian missile and nuclear program by joint US and Russian experts, East West Institute, *Groundbreaking U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment on Iran* <http://www.ewi.info/groundbreaking-us-russia-joint-threat-assessment-iran-0>
This is a bilateral US accord with Poland and the Czech Republic with respect to National Missile Defenses and is not based upon NATO or European Union decisions.

⁵ The threat of engaging in NATO Article V security guarantees has been raised in response to cyber attacks as well. See Hall Gardner "War and the New Media Paradox" (a critique of Marshall McLuhan), in *Cyber-Conflict and Global Politics*, ed. Athina Karatzogianni (Routledge, 2008).

⁶ On Russian demands that the EU help pay Ukrainian debts to insure energy transit from Russia through Ukraine, see "Putin warns on Europe gas transit" *Financial Times* (June 4, 2009), <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dfa6269e-5066-11de-9530-00144feabdc0.html>. See questions by Senator Richard Lugar and responses by Secretary of State Hilary Clinton <http://lugar.senate.gov/energy/press/pdf/ClintonOFR.pdf>. See also, Nick Snow "Clinton: Energy security a major US foreign policy element" *Oil and Gas Journal* January 26, 2009 http://www.ogj.com/articles/print_screen.cfm?ARTICLE_ID=351434. See also, Andrew Monaghan, "Energy Security: NATO's Limited, Complementary Role Research Division" NATO Defense College, Rome - No. 36 – May 2008 http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/publications/rp_36en.pdf

See also Senator Lugar's keynote speech to the German Marshall Fund conference on November 27, 2006 in Riga, Latvia. <http://lugar.senate.gov/energy/press/speech/riga.cfm>. Senator Lugar argued that NATO and Russia should engage in high-level discussions, but appeared to leave out the EU who is most directly afflicted. One cannot make the dual error that Russia is at fault for cutting off energy supplies and that Ukraine (or other transit states such as Turkey) is guiltless—given the fact that part of the crisis is due to the games played between Russian and Ukrainian energy oligarchs, Ukrainian debts and lack of transparency on both sides

⁷ Moscow Mayor Luzhkov, for example, was banned from entering the Ukraine when he argued that in 1948, Sevastopol "was set apart as a city subordinated to the state" and thus was never under Ukrainian jurisdiction. Here, Moscow has hoped that a fundamental constitutional change in the direct election of the Ukrainian president (making the President appointed by parliament) could also change Ukraine's pro-NATO position (and perhaps change its position on removing the Russian fleet in Sevastopol as well). See Roman Olearchyk, "Ukraine president seeks foreign help against 'coup'" *Financial Times* (June 5 2009). Whatever the case, the deepening Ukrainian financial crisis warns of continual political economic instability, particularly if Kiev cannot obtain much needed assistance from the EU, or World Bank. *Financial Times* (March 2, 2009). See World Bank, "Ukraine Economic Update" (April 7, 2009: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTUKRAINE/Resources/Macro_update_090407_e_final.pdf

⁸ One commentator has predicted that a new war between Russia and Georgia is inevitable- in part to establish a land link between Russia and its CSTO ally, Armenia. Pavel Felgenhauer, "Russia's Coming War with Georgia" *Eurasia Daily Monitor* Volume: 6 Issue: 29 February 12, 2009. [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=34493&tx_ttnews\[backPid\]=7&cHash=36bb337090](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34493&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=36bb337090)

⁹ Crisis Group, "Georgia-Russia: Still Insecure and Dangerous," *Europe Briefing* No. 53 (Tbilisi/Brussels, 22 June 2009); Vladimir Socor, "OSCE RIP in Georgia Eurasia" *Daily Monitor* Volume: 6 Issue: 126 (July 1, 2009).

¹⁰ For a neo-realist critique of Russian proposals, Marcel van Herpen, "The Proposal of Russian President Medvedev for a pan-European Security pact: Its Six Hidden Objectives and How the West Should Respond" Cicero Foundation (2008) <http://www.cicerofoundation.org/>

¹¹ NATO Secretary General De Hoop Scheffer stated at the Munich Security Conference, "I cannot see how we can have such a discussion of the new architecture ... when Russia is building bases inside Georgia. That cannot be ignored, and it cannot be the foundation of a new security architecture." Yet replacing Russian forces by UN international (not NATO) forces could be one way to build such a new architecture. "European Leaders Split on Russian Security Plan" <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4009723,00.html>

¹² As early as 1992, the Yeltsin administration had pressed for the establishment a NATO-Russia Council in which Russia would meet directly with NATO members, but NATO did not accept the proposal. While the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council was established in 1997, in which Russia and NATO representatives met separately from the North Atlantic Council, the NATO-Russia Council, in which NATO and Russia met directly, was not formed until May 2002 after the attack of September 11, 2001. The Bush administration's decision to enlarge NATO deep into eastern Europe in 2004 was, however, taken after the formation of the NATO-Russia Council, which had promised Moscow a voice, but not a veto. See Hall Gardner, *Dangerous Crossroads* (Praeger, 1997) See also, Peter Trenin-Straussov, The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council in 1997-1999: Anatomy of a Failure *BITS Research Note 99.1 July 1999* <http://www.bits.de/public/researchnote/rn99-1.htm>

¹³ The EU's Czech-led "Eastern Partnership" of May 2009 (backed primarily by Sweden and Poland) has looked toward developing closer ties with the states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine— but without coordinating policies with either the US or Russia. Belarus and Armenia are CSTO members.

¹⁴ EastWest Institute, EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY: ONE VISION, THREE PATHS (Brussels, Moscow, New York: June 23, 2009)

¹⁵ Although other forms of cooperative-collective peacekeeping structures are possible, one model (with modifications) might be the peacekeeping command system set up in Bosnia after the Dayton accords in 1995.

¹⁶ February 04, 2009 (RFE/RL) -- A summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has produced an agreement to set up a joint rapid-reaction force intended to respond to the "broadest range of threats and challenges." Afghanistan, which shares common borders with two member states of the organization -- Tajikistan and Uzbekistan -- is considered the main security threat to the organization.

¹⁷ Here, Baltic state complaints of Russian fighter jets frequently violating Baltic airspace and purportedly testing reaction times have resulted in the deployment of NATO air support Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) for the Baltic states involving flights of F-16s, F-15s, and Gripens, which in turn have generated Russian security concerns. In addition, NATO air forces may have to continue providing air policing over Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania well beyond 2020 because the Baltic states will unlikely be ready to operate fighters of their own. The alliance has agreed to deploy fighters for quick-reaction alert duties until 2018, but a more likely date for a handover to local forces is six years after that. <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4112709>

¹⁸ The Cooperative Airspace Initiative “involves the creation of a system of air traffic information exchange along the borders of Russia and NATO member states. Presently the system consists of four units in Russia and four units in NATO states.” See NATO and Russian official websites (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-D9C4BE7B-E43C9E3F/natolive/news_1729.htm?mode=news and [http://natomission.ru/en/society/article/society/artbews/40/.](http://natomission.ru/en/society/article/society/artbews/40/)) Joint system testing is currently underway on the Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI), which is being developed under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Council.

¹⁹ While it has been proposed, as one possible option, in the East West Institute (EWI) report, *EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY: ONE VISION, THREE PATHS*, that NATO could accept specific conditions on the admission of its members, this appears dubious. But NATO can establish an overall accord with Russia that would set verifiable limits on both sides. Instead of lifting territorial sub-limits for Russian forces, so as to fight terrorism, as has been suggested as one option in the EWI report, efforts should be made to increase confidence and security building measures, but at the same time, engage in joint flights, joint peacekeeping operations and joint anti-terrorist operations, for example... In such a way, we need to move from passive to active cooperation through joint action.

²⁰ The Adapted Treaty will enter into force when all 30 states-parties have ratified the agreement. Only Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine have done so. NATO member-states have linked their ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty with the fulfilment by Russia of the political commitments it undertook at the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit (so-called "Istanbul commitments") to withdraw its forces from Georgia and Moldova. In 2007 Russian President Putin suspended Russian participation in the CFE Treaty.

²¹ International efforts to resolve these crises can be augmented once NATO and Russia decide to compromise on CFE. On difficulties of finding a diplomatic settlement over Transdnistria, see, for example, Andrey Kalikh “Transdnistria and Moldova: unloved, unresolved” (April 8, 2009) <http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/email/transdnistria-and-moldova-unloved-unresolved>

²² See Hall Gardner, *Averting Global War*, Chapter 2.

²³ The Turkish proposal was initially criticized for including only Turkey, Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, and not Iran, the EU or the US. As Turkey will have a seat on the UN Security Council in 2009-2010, it might possess some weight to push for such an approach.

²⁴ On Turkey's recent relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia, see Kamer Kasim, "Turkey-Azerbaijan-Armenia Triangle" *The Journal of the Turkish Weekly* (May 27, 2009) <http://www.turkishweekly.net/print.asp?type=4&id=3153>

²⁵ The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) was established in Istanbul by eleven countries: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. In May 1999, it became the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation and established its Headquarters in Istanbul in March 2004. Serbia and Montenegro then joined in April 2004. In 2005, the United States applied for, and was granted, observer status at BSEC. Neighboring non-littoral countries like Albania, Greece, Serbia, Montenegro in the Balkans, and Azerbaijan and Georgia in the Caucasus, plus Moldova, along the Dneister, are full members. The major European countries and the USA possess only observers' status in the BSEC. Initially only Greece was simultaneously a member of NATO, the EU and the BSEC, but was then joined by Romania and Bulgaria, thus widening NATO and EU influence.

²⁶ See critique of Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson, "The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom Policy Review 125 (June-July 2004) in Hall Gardner, *Averting Global War, Chapt. 2*. See also Hall Gardner, *Toward a Separate Black Sea Command* (October 26, 2008) www.cicerofoundation.org/lectures/Black%20Sea%20Command17.ppt

²⁷ See Hall Gardner, *Averting Global War*, Chapter 2.

²⁸ EastWest Institute, EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY: ONE VISION, THREE PATHS (Brussels, Moscow, New York: June 23, 2009)

²⁹ For arguments in favor of full Russian membership in NATO, see Joschka Fischer, "Finding Russia's place in Europe", *The Guardian*, 11 January 2009. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jan/11/russia-eu>
Andrew Meier, *Let Russia join NATO*
<http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-meier20-2008aug20,0,1714241.story>
Michael Mandelbaum, "Russia: Ease Moscow's Suspicions," *Newsweek*, Dec 8, 2008; William S. Lind, "On War #283: The Russian Imperative" *Defense and National Interest* <http://www.d-n-i.net/dni/2008/11/19/on-war-283-the-russian-imperative/>; Ira Straus, "The Wrong MAP for Ukraine and Georgia" (April 2, 2008) <http://www.antiwar.com/orig/straus.php?articleid=12616>
Ira Straus, "A MAP for Russia" in Hall Gardner, *NATO and the European Union: New World New Europe, New Threats* (Ashgate, 2004); James A. Baker III, "Russia in NATO?" *Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 1, Winter 2002, 95-103.

³⁰ Moscow has been planning to set up naval facilities in Yemen (Socotra), Syria (Tartus), Libya (Tripoli), Vietnam (Cam Ranh), among other countries, in the next few years as an alternative to the Sevastopol base in Ukraine's Crimea... (but) "'Even 10 Tartuses or Cam Ranhs can't replace Sevastopol for the Russian Navy,' said Adm. Viktor Kravchenko, commander of the Black Sea Fleet in 1996-1998." RIA Novosti (January 20 2009). Russia is also considering opening a base at

Ochamchira, a seaside town in the separatist Georgian republic of Abkhazia. RIA Novosti (November 13, 2008) Another option is the shallow waters near Novorossiysk.

³¹ See Hall Gardner, *Averting Global War*, Chapter 2.

³² While used as a tool to help implode the Soviet Union, the concept of “captive nations” and national independence has lost its validity in the era of “globalization” and has increasingly become a “double-edged sword” that can be used by one major power against others to support national independence movements and ethnic diasporas. The concepts of autonomy and confederation should be used to replace that of “captive nations”...

³³ Former French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur has proposed “a permanent Union secretariat to prepare common positions for international meetings; gradual creation of a common trans-Atlantic market; linkage between the dollar and euro; converging policies on energy supply and its security; and the creation of a trans-Atlantic executive council of leaders that would convene every three months.” See Edouard Balladur, *Pour une Union occidentale entre l’Europe et les Etats-Unis* (2007). See also my earlier argument for a “Transatlantic Political-Economic and Strategic Council” linked to regional “Contact Groups” in Hall Gardner, “Toward New Euro-Atlantic Euro Mediterranean Security Communities,” in Hall Gardner (ed.) *NATO and the European Union: New World, New Europe, New Threats* (Ashgate, 2004).

³⁴ A different forum would be needed to discuss economic, trade and financial measures--- such as the issue of bringing Russia into the World Trade Organization.

³⁵ Russian and American discussions were said to have hit a snag when Moscow stated that Washington could deploy NMD systems on Russian territory or in Azerbaijan, but not on the territory of Poland and the Czech Republic. In particular, Russia has opposed the advanced radar system (that could coordinate targeting of US intercontinental missiles throughout the world) to be deployed in the Czech Republic, more so than the ten interceptors to be deployed in Poland. (At the same time, however, Moscow is concerned that the US could augment the numbers of interceptors to be deployed— if no deal is negotiated). The Obama administration could possibly stall on NMD deployments based on costs and failure of interceptors to pass operationally realistic testing.

³⁶ <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?c=EUR&s=TOP&i=4137382>