On March 24, 2010, Ian Hill, Ambassador of New Zealand to the Russian Federation, hosted a working lunch in partnership with the EastWest Institute and the Embassy of Switzerland in Moscow to discuss the recommendations of the EWI report Reframing Nuclear De-alert: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of U.S. and Russian Nuclear Arsenals. The meeting in Moscow involved representatives of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and several Russian think tank leaders, including the Russian Committee for Global Security and Arms Control, the Institute for U.S. and Canada Studies, the Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), the Moscow Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), PIR-Center and Moscow Aviation Institute.

Participants considered the de-alert issue in the context of START follow-on talks, the new version of the Russian military doctrine, the third U.S. nuclear posture review process and the upcoming 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference. After the November 2009 publication of the report, which was sponsored by Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, EWI organized similar meetings in Washington, Geneva and at the United Nations in New York. The goal of the meetings is to highlight the report’s recommendations for policymakers and arms control specialists and develop practical measures to reduce the dangers associated with the high-alert status of Russian and American strategic forces and of nuclear arsenals of other major states.

In introductory remarks, Ambassador Hill and Walter B. Gyger, Ambassador of Switzerland to the Russian Federation, emphasized their governments’ roles as long-standing and consistent advocates for nuclear disarmament and their work to build the political will necessary to decrease the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems. The objective of this work, they said, is to reduce the risks associated with nuclear weapons in the short term while making longer-term efforts towards a world without nuclear weapons.

Vladimir Ivanov, Director of EWI’s Moscow office, pointed out that the de-alert issue had previously been a marginal subject for EWI, mainly considered a potential trust-building measure to help Russia and the United States overcome the legacy of the Cold War. However, it soon became obvious that high-alert status of nuclear weapons should be seen not only as a vestige of the Cold War, but as a critical concern in the strategic security debate in the 21st century. The topic popped up in EWI’s work with the U.S.-Russian initiative to globalize the INF Treaty, nuclear and missile proliferation threat assessments and a study on the relevance of George W. Bush’s administration’s plans for ballistic missile defense (BMD) in Europe.

Most participants agreed with this approach and outlined new problems which should be considered when defining the de-alert problem in the post-Cold War context. Among them:

• The growing role of high-precision conventional weapons and the lack of parity in their development;
• BMD systems development, which will gain importance in supporting deterrence parity if major powers begin reducing nuclear arsenals.
• Increased risk of regional conflicts involving powers with limited nuclear-weapon capabilities like Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea and China.
• New threats associated with the risk of terrorist use of nuclear weapons by radical non-state actors.

These factors emphasize the need to avoid simplistic approaches to de-alerting. They also point to the timeliness of further development of this concept to involve a wider range of nuclear players.

Leading nuclear powers have voted against the UN General Assembly resolution to decrease the operational readiness of nuclear weapons, said EWI Senior Fellow Leonid Ryabikhin introducing the EWI report. This record demonstrates the  perception that existing approaches to the problem  are not effective and demands new policies and ideas to make the de-alerting process realistic and appropriate for all parties, he said. Most U.S. and Russian participants of the study agree that the de-alerting issue is much broader and more complex than viewed by those experts who think that the problem can be solved by simple physical measures, such as covering missile silos with earth, removing nose cones of missiles or removing guidance or control modules from missiles. The issue should be considered in a doctrinal, strategic and political context. The major subject for exploring breakthrough solutions would be decision-making procedures and algorithms.

General agreement with such approaches led some participants to conclude that no significant progress is possible unless the U.S. and Russia reconsider their nuclear posture doctrines based on mutual assured destruction. At the same time, some noted that the new Russian military doctrine provides for a lower reliance on strategic missile forces, reducing their use from the “situations critical to national security” (as in the earlier version of the doctrine) to situations “when the very existence of Russia is under threat.” This opened up opportunities for a renewed discussion on reducing the operational readiness of U.S. and Russian arsenals. One participant indicated that the new START agreement ratification by both countries could become a critical starting point for serious consideration of the de-alert issue in the framework of a bilateral arms control agenda.

There was general consensus among participants that the de-alerting concept would be successful if it were addressed as an integral part of the disarmament process. A phased approach to decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear arsenals was suggested, providing for incremental de-alerting harmonized with reductions of nuclear weapon delivery means and nuclear warheads. Particular attention in this process should be paid to establishing proper verification and control mechanisms. Experts also pointed out that keeping the minimum deterrence capability, as long as the deterrence logic continues to determine nuclear postures, will require of the two countries to keep some strategic forces in high levels of alert. But other elements could either be de-alerted completely or kept on reduced levels, which would allow a reversal to full readiness in case there is a need for a retaliatory strike.

Participants suggested some ideas to help policymakers and experts take further practical steps to promote the de-alert agenda:

• The process of reframing of the de-alerting issue launched at the seminar in Yverdon-les-Bains, Switzerland in June 2009 should be continued. It should aim to formulate a comprehensive new policy to solve the problem through robust and appropriate means.
• This process could include the creation of an ad hoc U.S.-Russian Task Force to work on an interdisciplinary base, including top-level military, political and technical experts to formulate suggestions for a new draft of the UN General Assembly Resolution on Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Nuclear Weapons Systems.
• Such an expert Task Force should collaborate closely with governments that sponsored the UN General Assembly Resolution on Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Nuclear Weapons Systems. Among other activities, the task force should make proposals to revise the resolution to make it acceptable to nuclear weapon states.
• The EWI report on nuclear de-alert, as well as recent results of the expert work on this issue, should be publicly available. A broad public discussion is needed in connection with and after the 2010 NPT Review Conference.
• Once the U.S. and Russia governments ratify the START follow-on agreement, special efforts should be made to engage the other nuclear powers–the UK, France,  China, India, Pakistan and Israel--into the development of de-alert policies and relevant international agreements.