EWI Vice President W. Pal Sidhu
with GCSP Director Ambassador Fred
Tanner

This report was prepared for the website of the Geneva Center for Security Policy

On 23 February 2010, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) hosted a presentation of a study on “Reframing Nuclear De-Alert: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of U.S. and Russian Arsenals,” with Dr W. Pal Sidhu, Vice President of Programs and Direction of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Program of the EastWest Institute and Dr Christophe Carle, Visiting Scholar in Disarmament at the GCSP on the distinguished panel. This study was initiated and sponsored by the governments of Switzerland and New Zealand.

Introductory remarks were made by H.E. Ambassador Dell Higgie, Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations and Other International Organisations in Geneva, and Ambassador for Disarmament, and Dr Christian Schoenenberger, Head of the Task Force on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation at the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. The panel was chaired by Ambassador Fred Tanner, Director of the GCSP.

Ambassador Higgie began by stressing that alert levels were neither in accordance with the intrinsic military and technical requirements nor reflective of the post Cold War environment. De-alerting will be possible provided there is a political will, and she remains hopeful for an ambitious outcome in line with current nuclear realities. Dr Schoenenberger revealed that while it was expected for nuclear states to partner on one side and non-nuclear states on the other side during debates, there were grounds for consensus. Issues in which there was agreement included the mismatch of political relations between the US and Russia and the state of preparedness, as well as the danger in maintaining a high alert status. Cases where the was a lack of consensus concerned the danger of alert levels in instances where states have de-alerted and then crises spark new arm races.

Dr Sidhu began the panel discussion explaining the importance of working with the US and Russia, as both possess the largest arsenals and they are the only states with doctrines related to nuclear war fighting. Alert levels have always been far from static, coming as close to minutes and hours while at other times dropping dramatically. De-alerting, however, is not new to the post Cold War system as in 1991 both the US and Russia agreed in a top-down effort to de-alert the entire weapon system carried by bombers.

Until the recommendations put forth by the study, the concept of de-alert was one of technical fixes, in which physical measures were put in place to prevent nuclear weapons from being launched on orders. Such dangerous moves however could be compared to "shutting down a computer and not using it because of bad software.” Instead of blocking these systems, a more effective approach would be to examine the doctrines and shift away from these policies, so that then the technical fixes can occur. Whereas within the triad of sea, air, and land based systems, there was consensus to de-alert the sea and air legs, land based ICBMs are in a constant state of high alert and almost cease to exist if this alert system is dropped.

While this will be a challenge, it is not insurmountable, and the only other biggest concern is regarding a re-alert race. Dr Sidhu provided four measures for the US and Russia to take: including this topic as part of the START negotiations, further enhancing safety, security, and survivability of their arsenals, exploring the joint data exchange of missile launches, and multilateralising the process of de-alert while taking into account the lessons from states who have already done so.
Dr Carle continued by recognising the abundance in perspectives on de-alerting even within the nuclear-armed states. Concerning survivability, nuclear weapons and ballistic missile defense systems will continue to exist within the immediate future, and so the focus should be on examining the options for deployment, and ensuring that procedures are accessible and transparent. These complementary measures are not solutions in themselves, but contributing elements for creating an environment where solutions are visible. Such topics accounted for differences in perspectives among the American and Russian experts and practitioners. While these measures may not sound as radical as some would like, for now they are the best options available.

Conclusions in brief:

• States are in consensus that the current alert levels of both the US and Russia are not reflective of their current relations and maintaining a high alert status is both dangerous and unnecessary.
• Alert levels have never been static, but have both risen and fallen dramatically over time
• Moves to de-alert are not new to the post Cold War system; the US and Russia have taken top-down initiatives to de-alert one leg of the triad
• While previous concepts of de-alert have focused on technical fixes, it would be more effective to modify the nuclear doctrines so that technical fixes can occur.
• Nuclear weapons will remain an unfortunate part of the international system for the time being, and so deployment methods should be examined and these procedures should be made accessible and transparent, in order to create an environment where a solution is possible.

The opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the GCSP or its partner institutions.