On February 17, 2010, as part of the Worldwide Security Conference in Brussels, the EastWest Institute convened a consultation to critically review the recommendations of Eliminating Nuclear Threats, the report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND). The consultation, held in cooperation with the Australian Mission to the European Union, discussed the report’s recommendations as they relate to two critical issues confronting policymakers today: the prospects for nuclear zero and the state of Iran’s nuclear program. The seminar was well attended by the diplomatic community and included participants from NATO, the European Union, the European Commission, the United States, Russia, Iran, Australia and Japan, among others.

Session I: Nuclear Zero: How does the ICNND Report Help?

In the first session, participants discussed the commission’s recommendations to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. The report argues that in order to achieve nuclear zero, the international community must delegitimize the centrality of nuclear weapons in international security doctrines, emphasize the normative and practical arguments against their use and re-examine the role of deterrence in international security and stability.

One ICNND commissioner noted that the road to a world free of nuclear weapons would be “long and bumpy,” justifying  the report’s cautious proposal to reduce the total number of nuclear weapons worldwide to 2,000 by 2025 as an intermediate step. This timeline is possible only if the U.S. and Russia, home to 90 per cent of the world’s estimated 23,000 nuclear weapons, can manage to eliminate just 500 nuclear weapons every year. This is a more conservative target compared to Global Zero’s proposal to free the world of nuclear weapons by 2025.

Participants also identified obstacles that threaten ongoing efforts, including: a lack of resources and the risks associated with dismantling nuclear warheads; an anticipated renaissance in nuclear energy and an associated increase in fissile materials; overwhelming difficulties in verification and compliance; and, to a degree, political commitment in national strategic postures, bilateral relations, and multilateral forums.

Participants also discussed the report in the context of the international security environment. Some argued that nuclear weapons no longer provide a military advantage in a world where cyber attacks and bioterrorism increasingly threaten international peace and security. Nuclear weapons also increase the risk that some nuclear-armed countries, confident in their military supremacy, might be tempted to launch conventional wars.

But others suggested that nuclear weapons are still relevant. They argued that NATO’s extended deterrence posture has prevented conventional wars, it remains an important element of the transatlantic link and it provides a disincentive for states to pursue nuclear weapon programs. It is therefore likely that NATO's new strategic concept, expected later this year, will maintain nuclear deterrence as a key pillar of the alliance but will continue to support its member states’ disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

A number of participants questioned this position and argued that deterrence does not necessarily equate to nuclear deterrence. Other security assurances that are not alliance-based, such as ‘no first use’ commitments, can replace nuclear deterrence. They also pointed out that justifications for nuclear deterrence are counterproductive in that they provide sound arguments for states such as Iran to pursue nuclear weapon programs.

Despite disagreements on the role of deterrence in international security, most participants supported ongoing disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. Recommendations from the session include:

• Any proposals on disarmament and non-proliferation must take into account the current international strategic and security environment. Proposals must also make the case that disarmament does not diminish, but rather enhances, international security.
• The only way to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons is with the leadership of non-nuclear-weapon states. They did not choose the nuclear option, and their role is an integral component of non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.
• International efforts should also include steps to delegitimize nuclear weapons. Such efforts could include: declarations that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter their use by other states; unconditional assurances to non-nuclear weapon states that nuclear weapons will never be used against them; declaration of no-first use commitments; and reductions in the operational readiness of nuclear arsenals.
• Regional and sub-regional security concerns directly affect disarmament efforts. Such efforts must initially focus on resolving political tensions.

Session II: Proliferation Dilemmas: the ICNND Report and Iran

The second session focused on the current state and future direction of Iran’s nuclear program.  

Most participants generally supported the ICNND’s conclusions on the current state of Iran’s nuclear program. But they also acknowledged that a degree of uncertainty was inevitable and unavoidable. The report states that Iran is “undoubtedly close to – and may already possess – breakout capability, but it has not yet crossed the red-line that really matters by acquiring nuclear weapons.” It further suggests that Iran is not in full compliance with a series of IAEA safeguards, IAEA Board of Governors decisions and UN Security Council resolutions, and that it has no intention to relinquish its uranium enrichment capabilities.

However, another opinion asserted that the program is entirely peaceful and Iran has no intention to pursue a weapons program. It was argued that in addition to a religious obligation not to develop weapons of mass destruction, the founder of the Iranian Revolution denounced nuclear weapons, a position reflected in the state’s constitution.  Further, the argument goes, a weapons program would be a strategic mistake because it would compromise Iran’s equal footing in international negotiations. If Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, it would have to compete with other nuclear states in a forum where the number of warheads is the determining factor of power. Instead, Iran’s power and influence comes from its support of international obligations, its conventional weapons and its refusal to use international aggression.

Clear disagreement emerged over the intentions behind the Iranian nuclear program. Participants agreed that there is a large trust deficit between Iran and much of the international community. Two factors exacerbate this deficit: international skepticism about Iran’s nuclear intentions and perceptions in Iran of historical anti-Iranian sentiments and inherent discrimination in international regimes governing nuclear technology and energy.

Despite disagreements about Iran’s nuclear program, participants agreed that negotiations are the only option and supported political, economic, and diplomatic efforts to normalize relations. Participants also agreed that negotiations should acknowledge Iran’s cultural contributions and its historical role in the region and the world.

Regarding the inclusion of Iran’s nuclear program in international negotiations, most participants maintained that negotiations must include the nuclear question to build confidence in the peaceful objectives of Iran’s program. Challenging this assertion was the view that any negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program, such as the cessation of enrichment programs, cannot be dictated by the other countries. Some also argued that the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) is the only legitimate forum to address nuclear issues, and that Iran will not participate in any discussions on the matter outside that forum, including negotiations with the P-5+1 (the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany). Some participants also asserted that the UN Security Council has no legal basis to address these matters and its resolutions cannot and will not be implemented by Iran.

Responding to these arguments, other participants noted that Chapter VII of the UN Charter gives the UN Security Council a responsibility to ensure international peace and security, and the the body has the legal basis to address Iran’s nuclear program. Moreover, it was stated that if Iran believes the IAEA is the only legitimate body, then they must also acknowledge the legitimacy of IAEA reports and Board of Governors decisions that conclude Iran’s nuclear program is not in compliance with safeguards.

Throughout the discussion, the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) was discussed as a critical opportunity in international negotiations. In October 2009 Russia, the United States, and France proposed that Iran send the majority of its low enriched uranium (LUE) to Russia and then to France, under IAEA supervision, for enrichment to produce the fuel for the TRR. Some participants argued that the proposal was a victory for the Iranian government because it implied a recognition of Iran’s right to enrichment.  The proposal, if accepted, would also force a reconsideration of three UN Security Council resolutions preventing Iran from exporting LEU.

But Iran has not accepted this proposal and, in February 2010, began to further enrich the LEU for use in the TRR. Iran’s  counter proposal was to keep this enriched uranium in Iran but under IAEA scrutiny in exchange for the ability to buy fuel directly on the international market. However, neither the P-5+1 nor the IAEA has accepted this proposal as of early March.

Seminar participants agreed that despite these serious differences, the possibility of negotiations between Iran and the international community remain. But the deficit of trust is severely hindering the process.

Recommendations from the session include:

• Iran could maintain its enrichment capabilities for peaceful purposes, but with an intrusive verification and safeguard regime.
• International negotiations would progress better if all parties avoided threatening language.
• In bilateral and international negotiations, demands should not be made before the negotiations have begun and all parties must build confidence so negotiations can proceed in good faith.
• The Iranian nuclear issue cannot be addressed without the context of regional and sub-regional issues. For example, Iran is facing two major wars in neighboring countries: Iraq and Afghanistan. Resolving these conflicts and would help pave the way towards long-term solutions.

Papers and speeches:

• Paper by Ken Berry, Research Coordinator of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (79K PDF)
• Comments by Guy Roberts, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for WMD Policy and Director of Nuclear Policy at NATO (24K PDF)

Click here to download the meeting agenda and a list of speakers (24K PDF)