Andrew Nagorski at the conference in Lviv

To mark the twentieth anniversary of the momentous events of 1989, a variety of Central and Eastern European NGOs held an international conference in Lviv, Ukraine from October 25 to 27. The idea was to assess the legacy of 1989 and the challenges confronting the region today. EWI Vice President and Director of Public Policy Andrew Nagorski chaired the plenary session, “Our region: Where do we go from here?” and a working group, “Russia and Central and Eastern Europe: Searching for a common Euro-Atlantic vision.” Three of those who participated in those discussions wrote up their conclusions for this web forum. Below, the perspectives of the Polish, Russian and Georgian participants:

The Twilight of Central European Solidarity

By Wojciech Maziarski

Maziarski is the editor-in-chief of Newsweek Polska, Newsweek’s Polish-language edition.

After the fall of communism in 1989, the Central European region was exceptionally stable. In contrast to the territory of the former Yugoslavia, there was no revival of historic conflicts and ethnic antagonisms, which in the 1940s led to mass murders in the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands. This peaceful development was primarily the result of the long policy of cooperation between anti-communist democratic opposition forces in various countries.

However, the factors which in the past decades led to the closeness of differing societies in this region are no longer as strong as they once were, which is why we are now witnessing the weakening—and possibly even the twilight of—Central European solidarity and cooperation.

First of all, there is no longer an Eastern bloc, where different societies see each other as allies in the struggle for sovereignty and freedom. Today average Hungarians, Czechs and Poles know very little about each others’ countries and don’t feel that such knowledge is particularly important to have.

Second, the geopolitical situations of different countries, which are no longer part of the same political-military bloc, have grown further apart. Some joined the European Union and NATO, others (for example, Ukraine) aspire to membership, and others (for example, Belarus) openly declare their distrust of Western structures. These differences mean that the interests of various countries and societies are increasingly at odds with each other. You could see this when Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary became part of the Shengen zone. To allow for the elimination of passport controls on their Western borders, these countries had to introduce visa requirements for their Eastern neighbors and rigorously adhere to the demands of Brussels, which is fearful of new immigrants. Warsaw, Prague, Bratislava and Budapest, to be sure, continue to declare their willingness to open up to their Eastern neighbors, but of course they won’t give up their chance to be integrated into the Shengen zone to do so.

This weakening of regional unity in the former Eastern bloc works to the advantage of Moscow, which, under the governments of Putin and Medvedev, is trying to rebuild its influence in the world. One can assume that the Kremlin will seek to further isolate some countries and to highlight their differences with the other countries in the region or the EU. We can see this, for example, in the case of Russian threats to cut off gas supplies to the West. In Putin’s public declarations, he again points to Ukraine as the culprit that may be responsible for the a potential lack of energy in the West. Russian propaganda doesn’t mention Poland or Lithuania, but for the inhabitants of those countries, it is clear that the Kremlin won’t stop once it has succeeded in subordinating Georgia or Ukraine. It will seek to implement a salami strategy, cutting off one piece at a time.

In Central Europe, the fear of a return of Russian domination is very much alive. Moscow is considered the main threat, while NATO is seen by Warsaw, Vilnius or Prague as the main means of curbing the Kremlin’s appetite. That’s why Barack Obama’s proclaimed “reset” in relations with Russia doesn’t arouse any enthusiasm in this part of Europe. Especially since the threat from a fundamentalist Tehran feels distant and fairly abstract here.

Start Cooperation on the Regional and Local Levels

By Alexey Ignatyev

Ignatyev is the program development director of the Regional Economic Development Agency in Kaliningrad, Russia. From 2000 to 2005, he worked on border cooperation projects for the EastWest Institute.

Taking into account the current controversies around the relationships between the Central and Eastern European countries, the EU, the United States and Russia, I believe that cooperation based on common sense as well as common economic, “people-to-people” and security interests will be a good alternative to confrontation. While this very practical and pragmatic kind of cooperation now would be difficult to arrange on the national level, it is starting on the regional and local levels--in particular, in the border areas between Central and Eastern Europe and Russia, where various organizations (local authorities, NGOs and businesses) have already had considerable experience with common initiatives and successful projects.

This cooperation could be a significant part of the EU Eastern Partnership policy on one hand, and the policy of creating common European spaces between the EU and Russia on the other. The mechanisms, forms and tools for such cooperation could be universal and based on best practices of trans-frontier cooperation that the EastWest Institute pioneered in the Baltic Sea region, the Carpathian region and the Balkans. Kaliningrad, along with its Polish and Lithuanian neighbors--the Southern Eastern Baltic Region (SEBR)--could serve as a model of true partnership between regions from the East and the West. This model could be brought to the attention of other regions in Central and Eastern Europe and Russia. There is already a proposal on how to create such a model in SEBR.

The role of the U.S. in this cooperation could be significant in terms of providing political, human and financial support. At the moment, neither the EU nor other international donors support this effort, which is why American involvement could be crucial. It would help pave the way for new forms of cooperation between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Russia.  This cross-border and interregional cooperation could play a serious role in changing the relationship between the parties on the national as well as the local level.

Another very important issue is how to make the EU Shengen visa regime more liberal and friendly for the non-EU countries of Eastern Europe and Russia. This could lead to more people-to-people visits and finally strengthen constructive trans-frontier cooperation and local development projects, building trust in the process. The experience of Finland is very interesting and important in this respect. It should be thoroughly studied so that other EU Eastern border countries can see whether there are lessons to be learned.

The Double Challenge of Security and Democracy

By Ghia Nodia

Nodia is the chairman of the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development in Tbilisi. In 2008, he served as Georgia’s Minister of Education and Science.

This conference was about commemoration, hence also celebration. We talked about twenty years of great change that brought liberty. Yet there was too much gloom and unhappiness in many speeches. We should not be too surprised by that because democrats are rarely happy and satisfied; this is probably in their nature.

Still, I want to start by saying that we should not be shy about celebrating as well. Twenty years ago we were captive nations indeed, and we are no longer. This means that if we are dissatisfied with how things are going in our countries, we do not have anybody else to blame. We know we are responsible for the failures ourselves. This may be the best definition of freedom: If we are unhappy, we are to blame.

Twenty years on, probably the most notable thing is how different we are. Many formerly captive nations are now firmly entrenched in the democratic world--with its numerous problems and shortcomings, to be sure, but still they are there. Some other countries -- one very big one and several that are not so big -- see the democratic world as an enemy and a threat, and do not want to be part of it. And then there are countries – I am coming from one of those – who are trying to build democratic institutions, but are less than successful in this. I will focus on the problems of this third group.

These are countries that are haunted by a double set of challenges: lack of security and lack of consolidated democratic institutions. These problems are deeply interconnected. The link is most conspicuous in my country, Georgia. It is true that we are failing to consolidate our democratic institutions and we have nobody else to blame for this. But it is also true that we are a country under attack from our northern neighbor, and at least one of the reasons for that (I am personally inclined to think that this is the chief reason) is that we are too democratic for their taste. This makes us dangerous, because we carry a virus that may undermine their regimes. This makes us, as well as Ukraine, frontier states. If we fall, the Baltic States immediately become the next frontier. I have just come from a NATO conference in Riga where the presidents of the three Baltic countries spoke, and they have a very clear understanding of this.

Therefore, with all the different faults that Ukrainian and Georgian democracies have, we have an especially great need for the kind of democratic solidarity expressed by the title of this conference, For Our Freedom and Yours!

Our divergent fortunes are also linked to divergent trajectories of development. Twenty years ago, Eastern Europe was carried away by the euphoria of freedom – which ultimately brought it to where it is now. We in Georgia experienced some of that euphoria – but, unfortunately, in our case (as in the Caucasus and the Balkans in general) it was overwhelmed by the euphoria of ethnic nationalism, and that immersed us in the period of civil wars. We spent the decade of 1990s mostly recovering from these wars rather than focusing on building democratic institutions (although some partial steps in that direction were also made). It was our turn to go through the period of the euphoria of freedom during the so-called color revolutions, and it felt good.

However, almost six years after that euphoria, we are deeply dissatisfied with where we are. Now we are much more perplexed by the complexity of the democratic exercise, and this is probably makes perfect sense. Breakthroughs are necessary and uplifting, but ultimately the success of democracy-building depends on much more mundane activities, on calculating interests and trade-offs and gradually improving the quality of civil and governmental institutions.

We understand that we are still not there, and that there will be zigzags and setbacks along our way. Moreover, there is no guarantee of ultimate success at all since this is in an open-ended process. But if I did not have the hope of success, and if I did not recognize the deep importance of democratic solidarity for that success, I would not have participated in this conference in Lviv.