In the first of a two-part series for the Pakistani daily The News, Ikram Sehgal traces the history of religious education and the rise of violent extremism in Pakistan.

Sehgal, a member of EWI's Board of Directors, begins his history in the colonial era, when the concept of the madrassah changed. "During the eleventh and twelfth centuries, madaris [the Arabic-form plural of madrassah] specialized in law and jurisprudence," writes Sehgal. " Today’s madrassah is an Islamic religious school where students, as young as nine or ten, at times even younger, learn religious education, schooled first of all in reading and then in religious studies."

Madaris associated with two schools of Islam are of most importance when considering extremism in Pakistan, Sehgal suggests: those of the Deobandi sect and those of the Ahle-Hadith sect. Both follow a stricter interpretation of Islam other sects in Pakistan.

The influence of such madaris skyrocketed in the 1980s, Sehgal writes. "Seminaries mushroomed during the regime of military ruler Ziaul Haq. His Islamisation policies were meant mainly to establish his own legitimacy," he suggests. "Other factors include the Iranian revolution, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan and the subsequent Afghan 'jihad' against Soviet troops, and Pakistan's involvement in the Afghan war."

On the demand side, Sehgal argues that economics is a major factor in the proliferation of extremist madaris in Pakistan. "Functioning as shelters and orphanages for many young children, runaways and refugees where the state apparatus is lacking, madaris have come forward as a parallel system of education that is more viable for the impoverished," he writes. On the supply side, he points to an influx of aid from the Middle East, adding: "Private citizens from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait, thinking they are spreading the message of Islam through petrodollars, fund them generously…. This money also encouraged a Wahabi, jihad-centered curriculum."

Former President Pervez Musharraf came close to reversing this trend towards extremism, Sehgal suggests. "In 2002 he made key pledges regarding madrassah reforms," he writes. "The government promised: (1) the registration of all madaris to know which groups were running which religious schools; (2) regulation of the curriculum so that all madaris would adopt a common government curriculum by the end of 2002; (3) adoption of measures to stop the use of madaris and mosques as centres for the spread of political and religious inflammatory statements and publications; and (4) establishment of model madaris providing useful modern education.

But change was not forthcoming. "Despite all the good talk, none of Musharraf's 2002 promises to reform madaris have been fulfilled, or even come close to it," he writes. "Only three model madaris have been set up – one each in Karachi, Sukkur and Islamabad, with a total of 300 students. Compared to the estimated two million students in the more than 12,000 madaris in Pakistan this number is ridiculous."

"There is a dire need for the fulfilment of the promises made by the Musharraf regime in 2002," Sehgal writes, concluding the first installment. "More important is the need to implement alternatives to the madressah, to reduce the dependence of the poor and impoverished on it."

Click here to read Sehgal's column in The News.

His second column will appear in The News on Thursday, May 27.