Countering Insurgency and Terrorism in Pakistan

Writing in his weekly column in the Pakistani daily The News, Ikram Sehgal argues that the Pakistani military is starting to make progress in it’s struggle against terrorism and deserves more support from the United States.

Tracing the last decade of Pakistani campaigns against militants and extremists, Sehgal identifies two insurgencies the Pakistani military must fight: one feeding the Taliban in Afghanistan and the other directed towards Pakistan and the world in general

The fight against these insurgencies falls on the Pakistani military, Sehgal suggests. “Locally recruited Frontier Corps troops are lightly armed, good only in their policing role,” he writes, “dealing with internecine tribal rivalry and border smuggling, rather than engaging in military operations combating well armed and experienced guerillas.”

He adds that civilian agencies are also unable to fill a counter-insurgency role. “Even though terrorism must be the domain of civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs), presently it is beyond the capacity of the LEAs to combat terrorism,” he writes.

Sehgal suggests that flawed operations between 2004 and 2007 and two intense missions in 2009 have diminished the militaries ability to fulfill its leading role in fighting insurgents. He argues that operations in Pakistan’s tribal areas under former President Pervez Musharraf were badly flawed. “Some Division Commanders and most of the Corps Commanders promoted by Musharraf were meant for his personal survival, not deserving promotion past the Lieutenant Colonel’s rank,” he writes. “With consequent set-backs in operations a peace treaty [with militants] had to be signed.”

But military strategy has improved since then, says Sehgal: “For a change General Headquarters performance has been commendable, not only juggling training in counterinsurgency, but rotating formations and units (and thus getting tremendous live battle inoculation),”

Sehgal continues saying that future operations will require considerable support, “The next 16-20 weeks are crucial for rotating fresh troops, replenishing depleted ammunition reserves and inducting of increased aviation capability into the diminished military order of battle. To protect against improvised explosive devices and roadside bombs, we badly need mine-resistant amour protected  vehicles (perhaps on loan) from those now surplus in Iraq.” 

He further suggests that the Pakistani Army should establish a counterterrorism force modeled after Pakistan’s successful Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF), an endeavor that will need international support: “Using the ANF existing structure as a nucleus, it should be converted into the counterterrorism force. Allocating $18 billion this year for the Afghan Army, having less than 1 percent of the coalition’s 10 percent casualties of the total in the combat region, compared to the 90 percent suffered by Pakistan is a disgrace. What about re-allocating $5-6 billion to form the counterterrorism force and replenish/refurbish Pakistan Army’s capacity?” 

He concludes: “Our friends who are stuck in the groove of a ‘do more’ mantra need to put their money where their mouth is.”

Click here to read Sehgal’s commentary in the News