EWI board member Ikram Sehgal argues that a U.S.-Pakistan civilian nuclear deal like the one between the U.S. and India can further the cause of nuclear nonproliferation.

Writing in his weekly column in the Pakistani daily The News, Sehgal argues that the global nonproliferation regime cannot survive without the engagement of Pakistan, India and Israel, the three nuclear powers not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

“The NPT cannot be complete without the accession of these states,” he writes. “What will the effectiveness of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty be if these States are not party to it? With four preparatory Conferences failing to agree on an agenda for discussion in the May 2010 Review Conference, the NPT is already in trouble.  If we continue with this rather lame non-existent regime against proliferation of Nuclear weapons, is the May 2010 exercise likely to be meaningful?”

Pakistan is of greatest concern, he suggests. “With access to nuclear fuels and peaceful nuclear technology, India’s need for its nuclear power stations has been taken care of by access given to the Nuclear Suppliers Group,” he writes, adding “Since Israel is not producing nuclear weapons any more, and is known to be pliant and conforming to U.S. diktat, Pakistan is the odd one out.”

Sehgal argues that fears of terrorist use of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have made the U.S. reluctant to grant Pakistan a civilian nuclear deal like the U.S.-India agreement. This reluctance drives Pakistan to acquire untested technology from China, he suggests.

“What would be the quid pro quo for Pakistan to get larger nuclear power plants which it desperately needs to overcome its severe-energy shortages?” he asks. “The US-India Nuclear Accord has created a dangerous imbalance in nuclear détente with India that Pakistan has to address.  When it has already voluntarily subjected itself to IAEA monitoring of its civilian nuclear assets, why deny it access to nuclear material and force it to depend on the nuclear black-market, a two-way street which is dangerous for Pakistan, and for the world?”

Sehgal argues that a U.S.-Pakistan nuclear deal would be compatible with a recent U.S. Senate bill that requires the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to track sources of nuclear material. “It is in Pakistan’s interest not to remain susceptible to possible accusations about a future terrorist incident being attributed to proliferation from this country,” he concludes. “Why not narrow down this ‘window of doubt’ by ensuring Pakistan gets a deal similar to the one India got? The world should have a vested interest in bringing Pakistan out of the nuclear cold.”

Click here to read Sehgal's column in the News.