Manuel Zelaya. UN Photo/Jenny Rockett

Recent events in Honduras have highlighted the complexities of conflict prevention in Central America and have confounded the region’s political actors. The Honduras crisis has shown that despite a multitude of peace agreements and commitments to reform in the last two decades, states, regional organizations and international actors are still unwilling or unable to prevent conflict in the region.

At a recent meeting in Panama on preventive action in Central America and the Caribbean experts and officials from government, military, police, civil society and regional and international organizations offered proposals to ensure stability after the recent elections in Honduras. The discussion was part of a broader dialogue convened by EWI and the United Nations Development Program to help develop a new regional security concept and to integrate conflict prevention into the security and development agenda.

The following brief summarizes the participants’ analysis of the situation in Honduras.

Summary:

The conflict in Honduras had more to do with the ruling elite’s unhappiness with the deposed president’s economic and social policies than with the failure of democratic procedures or the “intervention” of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. Elections can only have a limited “healing effect” in such circumstances.

A major factor that has led to continuing instability is the international community’s failure to send a clear message that interruption of the democratic process will not be tolerated in the Western Hemisphere. Much of this failure has been because of increasing division between countries about the importance of the election and the role of the U.S. Further, alliances between oligarchs in Honduras and influential individuals in Washington have made solutions even more difficult. Polarization within the Organization of American States made the organization’s work difficult, inefficient, and not very credible.

A credible space for action is for the UN to facilitate a process that engages Honduras’s social and political actors in a social reform process that feeds into the new president’s agenda. Such a process would play a strong supporting role in reducing social unrest and increasing political stability in Honduras. This might be the only feasible option available given the situation in Honduras and the unlikely possibility of any state or regional organization playing a constructive role in the post-election period.

Key Observations:

• Multilateral organizations were ineffective after the June 2009 coup in Honduras. Polarization among the Organization of American States hampered a more constructive role for the organization.
• Application of existing OAS protocols could have helped pressure actors to produce a different outcome. The OAS’s Democratic Charter clearly establishes mechanisms to deal with "unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order or an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime."
• The UN could play a bigger role given the situation in Honduras and the unlikely possibility that any state or regional organization would play a constructive role in the post-election period.
• The UN should provide support and resources to enable a countrywide Track 2 process that convenes the different factions (political parties, social groups, unions and others) to develop a “social contract” for Honduras. This social contract would be a key deliverable for the new Honduran president.
• The UNDP should take the lead in coordinating different UN bodies so they can support the Track 2 process;
• A detailed, non-political analysis of different factors and actors is necessary if all external parties are to agree on a starting point for action;
• There is an urgent need to identify champions in Honduras of a Track 2 process, including representatives from the media and the corporate sector, who can feed the process into the new president’s agenda.

Internal Dimensions of the Crisis:

Despite the complexities of the Honduras case, participants agreed that the main reasons for the conflict had little to do with democratic procedures or “intervention” from Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. They suggested that the conflict was the result of the ruling elite’s discontent with deposed President Manuel Zelaya’s economic and social measures, especially his policies on oil imports and the 66% increase in the minimum wage.

Honduras is among the poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere, second only to Haiti. It has some of the world’s most extreme income inequalities and has shown almost no social progress in the last two decades.

Zelaya’s economic and social reform program did not enjoy broad public support. But, participants said, it did threaten the ruling elite of landowning and commercially dominant families, who also own much of the country’s media. Further, the two principal parties did not offer many alternatives to the political system and had reason to fear political mobilization spurred by Zelaya’s proposed constitutional assembly.

Meanwhile, regional organizations and the international community were too polarized to deliver a unified message about a disruption in Honduras’s democratic process. In this context, a coup became the most effective means for Zelaya’s opponents to block his policies. Hugo Chavez’s “intervention” – Honduras’s inclusion in the ALBA group – provided a convenient political cover, especially in the U.S.

Most participants doubted the “healing effect” of an election under such circumstances. Many referred repeatedly to Haiti and its iterative cycles of elections and violence. The democratic process in Haiti often disenfranchised key groups, leading them to believe that they had nothing to gain from the electoral outcome. With disenfranchisement came more violence.

To avoid Haiti’s fate, outside pressure must induce the incoming administration in Honduras to work toward social change and extend democratic participation. Without such an effort, participants fear that the election alone will not save Honduras from further conflict, especially given the circumstances in which they were held.

External dimensions:

Participants were critical of the role of the international community and its increasing divisions over the Honduran elections. Many were especially critical of the U.S. position, which they suggested was easily manipulated because of political alliances between oligarchs in Honduras and well-placed supporters in Washington. American wavering, they argued, was a major factor in the international community’s failure to send a clear message that interruption of the Honduran democratic process would not be tolerated in the Western Hemisphere.

Instead, it became obvious that a “Cold War” mentality had taken hold. It appeared that many in the international community were more interested in preventing further “influence” from Chávez and less in the means with which they did so.

Brazil, the country with the most successful development model in the region, argued that disregard of the democratic process would damage democratic development in the region and encourage autocratic rule. Unfortunately, few others shared that view.

Latin American participants expressed hope that the European Union, with no military interests in the region, would take a more principled stance than the U.S. Military interests, especially the Pentagon’s Forward Location Base in Honduras, were too clearly visible in the U.S. position, they said.

Conclusion

Honduras is among the poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere, second only to Haiti. It has some of the world’s most extreme income inequalities and has shown almost no social progress in the last two decades. In such a country, a government whose citizens question its legitimacy will likely be unsustainable and can create a breeding ground for conflict.

This discussion was a case study about the international community’s role in the prevention of such violence. It did not address the merits or faults of the policies that led to Zelaya’s removal. Instead, it focused on steps the regional and international actors can take to help restore democratic order in Honduras. The overwhelming conclusion of the discussion was that the international community, especially the UN, should do all it can to extend political participation in Honduras and help the new government to address the concerns of the many social groups that are being left out of the political process. Regional organizations such as the Organization of American States would ideally play this role, but they cannot be constructive unless they resolve their own differences first.

The EastWest Institute is convening similar discussions around the world, including the Middle East, Central and South Asia, Asia Pacific and Africa to develop global mechanisms to prevent violent conflict. Similar briefings will be published on our web site over the next 12 months and will inform the Global Conference on Preventive Action scheduled for late 2010.